In this moment of geopolitical flux and climate urgency, the new German government can act as a vital broker between Europe and China, write three policy experts
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China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, meets Friedrich Merz, now Germany’s chancellor, at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025 (Image: Sven Hoppe / Alamy)
With a new government formed in May, Germany’s trajectory on climate policy, economic strategy and relations with China is poised for a recalibration.
The transition arrives at a critical moment not only for Germany and its EU partners but also for global climate diplomacy. Ten years after the Paris Agreement, governments are now preparing their 2035 climate targets. Yet with the US withdrawing from the agreement, and deepening trade tensions between the West and China, international cooperation is on shaky ground.
There is a key opportunity for renewed engagement in late July at the EU-China Summit, preceded by the EU-China High-Level Environment and Climate Dialogue. In previous years, bilateral meetings between the US and China often paved the way for breakthroughs in international climate policy. Amid the geopolitical turmoil presided over by US President Donald Trump, there is a vacuum to be filled for the EU and China. The talks in July have the potential to build some much-needed momentum on the road to new and updated national climate targets, which are expected at the UN General Assembly in September.
The EU has a chance to raise the stakes, but this will hinge on the role that the new German government is willing to play. How will it reshape its relationship with China bilaterally? Can it help build a majority among EU member states in time for ambitious 2035 climate targets? Targets for 2040 are also in the balance, as the EU Commission has formally proposed a legally binding target for the bloc of a 90% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2040, compared to 1990 levels. A decision is expected on that after the summer break. A positive outcome will require a qualified majority among EU member states.
What the new chancellor’s leadership means for relations with China
Germany’s approach to China is expected to see yet another change under the new chancellor, Friedrich Merz. During her tenure in 2005-2021, Angela Merkel had cultivated a “special relationship” with Beijing, emphasising pragmatic cooperation and regular institutionalised dialogues. Olaf Scholz largely continued along this path in 2021-2025 while cautiously integrating “de-risking” into German policy. Merz, who comes from the conservative CDU party, has indicated that he will take de-risking to the next level. A position paper published by the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in 2023 set out long-term and strategic priorities to safeguard German industrial competitiveness. It signalled a more hawkish stance on issues related to industry and trade interests. This aligns with broader EU efforts to shield the internal market and key industries from Chinese competition.
A more assertive stance still allows room for pragmatism, particularly in sectors like clean tech, where German industry remains tightly interwoven with Chinese supply chains and manufacturing ecosystems. German companies stand to benefit from collaboration with Chinese ones when it comes to mutual technology transfer and investment in cutting-edge tech. At the same time, pressure is building across German industry for stronger defensive measures. An influential industry association, the German Engineering Federation (VDMA), has issued a position paper urging the government and EU to adopt tougher industrial policies to counter what it sees as unfair competition. As such, a dual-track strategy is likely to emerge, with more assertive protection of domestic industries alongside openness for collaboration where it benefits both sides, particularly in areas such as clean technologies.
Indeed, Chancellor Merz and President Xi Jinping’s initial phone call after the German election underscored the importance of sustained dialogue. Both leaders mentioned climate change as a key area for cooperation. The call suggests that, despite friction in other domains, climate could remain a stabilising force in the relationship. In the China strategy of the previous administration, published in 2023 and a first for a German government, climate cooperation was also defined as a focus area of bilateral engagement. This strategy received a fair bit of criticism. It was accused of being too much effort for too little reward for the several ministries involved in creating it across a troubled coalition, and for in the end being more of a position paper than a strategy. However, the new German government in its coalition treaty announced that it would “revise” the China strategy “in line with the principle of ‘de-Risking’”. It remains to be seen what balance this revision will strike between climate cooperation and de-risking.
A first test will come with the bilateral government consultations that were a defining feature of Merkel’s China policy. These roughly biennial meetings involved state leaders and ministers of an exclusive group of partner countries. They happened once more with China under the auspices of Scholz in Berlin in 2023. Due to take place again this year, it would be telling if Merz allowed the tradition to die out. Rather than merely keeping it alive, he could choose to make the exchange more European by inviting representatives from other member states, notably France. That country has recently increased its efforts to engage with China on environmental and climate issues.
Climate policy under the new German government
Merz sees climate change as a serious problem, but the approach of his government is expected to be quite different to that of his predecessor. The coalition’s treaty laid out the legislative ambition of the partnership of the Conservatives (CDU/CSU) with the Social Democrats (SPD). It indicates a shifting focus from regulatory approaches to market-based instruments, competitiveness and technological innovation. This includes support for controversial technical solutions that have limited proven viability, such as carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS). Interestingly, the positioning of technical innovation and green industrial policy as the preferred solutions to reduce emissions has parallels with elements of China’s own climate strategy.
Germany’s long-term climate goals remain broadly unchanged
One imminent institutional change is that all work on domestic and international climate policy within the German government are to be reunited under a single ministry, following the previous government’s dispersal of responsibilities across different ministries in an effort to mainstream climate issues.
The role of special envoy for international climate action, previously held by Jennifer Morgan, has been abolished, alongside other envoy positions. As it stands, the lone administrative state secretary, Jochen Flasbarth, an experienced climate negotiator, will have his hands full with the entire German climate portfolio, both domestic and international. In a recent interview, he promised continuity with Morgan, with whom he used to work closely.
Despite some restructuring, Germany’s long-term climate goals remain broadly unchanged. The country’s political leadership remains committed to achieving carbon neutrality by 2045, five years ahead of the EU’s overall target, and to phasing out coal by 2035, or 2038 at the latest. As the EU member states are in a heated debate about climate targets for 2035 and 2040, Germany could play an important role in ensuring the targets align with the Paris Agreement. It could help to prevent further weakening of the bloc’s ambition. CDU and SPD climate experts were in close contact with the EU Commission when negotiating the passage on climate ambition included in the coalition treaty.
Prospects for bilateral and EU-level engagement with China on climate
There is a risk that in bilateral relations with China climate ambition will be sidelined in favour of industrial protectionism or competitiveness arguments, as Germany confronts trade tensions with the country over electric vehicles and renewable technologies. In the context of the EU’s tariffs on Chinese EVs and other ongoing subsidy investigations, bilateral climate engagement may be overshadowed by commercial disputes. These complex interlinkages require a coordinated approach across different German ministries and EU member states.
Revising its approaches, both to China and tackling climate change, the German government will have to navigate the challenge of heavy competition in green industries, while advancing climate action jointly, both domestically and abroad. Formats like the Dialogue on Climate Change and Green Transformation, a result of the bilateral consultations already mentioned, do serve as an opportunity for closer coordination and mutual understanding. This pursuit of climate engagement with China could pay rare dividends during times of strained and volatile geopolitics. It could help keep diplomatic channels open even amid rising tensions. It could also enable German industry to take part in potential breakthrough technologies emerging from China, such as in advanced battery storage.
With the US increasingly mired in domestic polarisation and with global climate diplomacy under threat of rollback, Europe must step up. The EU’s ability to influence China’s climate trajectory – through technical cooperation, standard setting, and regulatory requirements – depends on high-level political engagement. July’s summit offers a crucial opportunity for this.
President Xi has framed Germany – Europe’s largest economy and China’s most significant trade partner on the continent – as a key interlocutor for enhanced EU-China cooperation. Germany needs to leverage this role, for example, by supporting a strong EU-China joint statement on climate change ahead of the COP30 climate summit in Brazil. A similar US-China statement set the stage for the Paris Agreement a decade ago. An EU-China accord could revive trust in global multilateral cooperation on climate change. It must be anchored in mutual commitments to decarbonisation and in ambitious 2035 climate targets as part of their new Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
As the new German government finds its footing, close coordination with France may prove to be critical. A good place to start would be to evoke France’s spirit and diplomatic efforts during its COP presidency in 2015, which resulted in the Paris Agreement. Close alignment with the EU Commission will also enable Germany to speak with a strong voice at the EU level and internationally to push ahead with ambitious climate action.
Working with China to set ambitious NDCs will be critical. China accounted for around 90% of emissions growth over the last decade. To align with the Paris Agreement, it would have to reduce its emissions by more than 30% by 2035. For the EU to engage China on this effectively, it will have to come forward with its own ambition that should be a 76% reduction in emissions by 2035, and at least 90% by 2040, with limited use of international credits and direct carbon removal, as the EU Commission’s recent proposal lays out. Germany could play a facilitating role in advancing the adoption of both of these EU climate targets before the UN General Assembly in September. Negotiating from a position of unity and upheld ambition could provide EU leaders with the needed credibility to coordinate with China on NDC ambition and the timing of deliveries.
Conclusion
In this moment of geopolitical flux and climate urgency, Germany has the potential to act as a vital broker between Europe and China. By grounding its China policy in shared climate interests, promoting European unity, and supporting ambitious, reciprocal action ahead of COP30, Berlin can help reignite momentum for global cooperation.
At the same time, Germany’s own climate approach is shifting. The question is whether this shift signals a serious commitment to climate leadership or a quiet reprioritisation of economic competitiveness over environmental responsibility.
This month’s summit offers a chance to test this potential. A strong joint statement, focused on accelerating ambition for 2035 NDCs, managing clean-tech tensions, and reinforcing multilateral frameworks, could mark a turning point. If done right, it would echo the spirit of the 2014 US-China joint statement and lay the groundwork for another transformative decade.
Whether Germany seizes that opportunity will depend on the choices made in the coming weeks. But the message is clear: at a time when climate leadership is in short supply, Berlin must step up – not just for Europe, but for the planet.
Authors: Belinda Schäpe, Martin Voss, Barbara Pongratz
This article was originally published on Dialogue Earth under the Creative Commons BY NC ND licence. Read the original article.
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